

































The effectiveness of legislation is difficult to measure. From a European perspective, the Habitats Directive could be considered effective when all Member States have fully implemented its provisions into national law and all national authorities apply and enforce the European rules on species and habitat conservation. Then, from a strictly legal point of view, the legislation seems to be effective. The latter, however, does not necessarily mean that the loss of biodiversity is halted. In the EU's Sixth Environmental Action Programme, it is acknowledged that today’s complicated environmental problems cannot be tackled by legislation alone (European Commission, 2001b).
Legal instruments could also be considered effective if they actually halt biodiversity loss, or - even better - if they lead to recovery of populations of endangered species or of endangered habitat types (‘applied efficiency’ as opposed to ‘legal efficiency’). With this as a measure of effectiveness, the figures provided by the European Environment Agency show a rather bad situation. On the basis of these figures, Krämer (2002) even concludes that ‘despite all our best efforts, nature slowly but progressively withdraws from Western Europe’. Still, what is the exact relationship between legal instruments and biodiversity loss? Suppose, that for a certain species, the numbers are increasing. Does this mean that legislation designed to protect this species has been effective? Or have other factors contributed to the survival of the species as well? These questions can only be answered at the level of individual species or of individual habitat types.
Still, it is important to try to get insight into the effectiveness of legislation. In the Sixth Environmental Action Programme, measuring progress has been included as one of the key actions. The importance of this action is beyond doubt: ‘Policy decisions can also be assisted by a good understanding of the trends for different problems which can permit the construction of scenarios and models for testing the likely effectiveness of different measures. A good understanding of the socio-economic trends which are often the main driving forces behind environment issues is also critical to the development of effective policy.’ (European Commission, 2001b)
Ten years have passed since the EC Habitats Directive (Directive 92/43/EEC on the Conservation of Natural Habitats and of Wild Fauna and Flora)​[1]​ was adopted in Europe, while thirty years have passed since the enactment of the United States Endangered Species Act (ESA).​[2]​ Both sets of regulations have by some been criticized for being too strict, and have by others been hailed as the only way to combat extinction of species. It is interesting to compare both systems, since Americans and Europeans seem to be able to learn from each other. Europeans may learn from the longer experience the US has with the ESA. Americans may learn something from the first experiences with the Habitats Directive in Europe, where there generally is more pressure on available space than in the US; since pressure on lands in the US is rapidly increasing at the moment, the situation in many regions in Europe offers the US a glance at its future.




2. IMPLEMENTING THE HABITATS DIRECTIVE IN THE EU MEMBER STATES

The first binding EC-law on nature conservation was the Birds Directive enacted in 1979. ​[3]​ This Directive, together with the 1979 Bern Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats,​[4]​ laid the foundation for the Habitats Directive. The main difference, obviously, is the much wider scope of the Habitats Directive. Article 2 of the Habitats Directive states as the main aim ‘to contribute towards ensuring biodiversity (...).’ 
From a legal perspective, the Habitats Directive is the most important instrument promoting biodiversity in the European Union, because it has many binding implications for national biodiversity law in present and future EU Member States.​[5]​
	The provisions of the Habitats Directive, as the provisions of all Directives, have to be transposed into binding national legislation within the time limits set by the Directive. Article 249 of The Treaty Establishing the European Community (EC-Treaty) provides that Directives are binding on each Member State as to the result to be achieved. However, national authorities are vested, under some circumstances, with discretion as to how to implement Directives.​[6]​ The degree of discretion accorded to Member States depends on the precise wording of the Directive in question. When looking at the field of environmental law in general and of the Habitats Directive in particular, we can conclude that the European Court of Justice takes a rather strict position: Member States are required to be very precise when transposing Directives, so as to ensure beyond any doubt that the goals of the Directive will be met. In conservation law cases, the Court often adds that this is especially relevant in cases such as these ‘in which the management of the common heritage is entrusted to the Member States in their respective territories.’​[7]​
After the provisions of a Directive have been transposed into national legislation accurately and within the time limit, national laws have to be applied. To ensure that the goals of the Directive are achieved, applicable national laws will have to be interpreted in the light of the Directive.​[8]​ However, sometimes, a Member State does not implement the provisions of a Directive adequately. Possible causes are delays in the (political) process of drafting and adopting legislation, (systematical) difficulties to fit provisions of the Directive into existing national legislation, and the belief that existing national law is sufficient when in fact it is not. In a case of inaccurate transposition (or when a Member State has not yet transposed a Directive at all), provisions of the Directive may take direct effect (Jans, 2000a). When the duties arising from a provision are clear enough, national authorities (including decentralised authorities) and national courts are not allowed to apply existing national legislation, but instead are required to apply the relevant provision of the Directive. Courts must even do so on their own initiative, setting aside the national provisions.​[9]​
At the same time, the European Commission has the power to bring matters before the Court of Justice, if it feels that a Member State has failed to fulfill an obligation under the Treaty (Article 226 EC Treaty). In such an infringement procedure, the Court can order a Member State to pay a penalty for not observing a duty under EC law (Jans, 2000a).​[10]​ European citizens or NGOs can lodge a complaint with the European Commission when they feel that a Member State (i.e. a governmental - including a judicial - body in a Member State) does not comply with EC-law. However, it is up to the Commission to decide whether or not to start an infringement procedure against a Member State. As far as the Birds and Habitats Directives are concerned, the European Commission in fact brought many cases, against almost all Member States before the Court of Justice, thus giving a strong impetus to national authorities to comply with these directives. Some of these cases will be discussed below.

3. CORE ELEMENTS OF THE HABITATS DIRECTIVE

The Habitats Directive basically consists of two sets of rules. First, there is a section on the designation of Special Areas of Conservation (SACs). Second, there is a section on species protection. The Birds Directive has a similar structure, except here designated areas are called Special Protection Areas (SPAs). Section 3.1 will first deal with the main provisions of the Birds and Habitats Directives on area conservation (i.e. Articles 3-7 of the Habitats Directive, and Article 4 of the Birds Directive). Then section 3.2 will discuss the most important provisions of both directives on species protection (i.e. Articles 12-16 of the Habitats Directive, and Articles 5-6 of the Birds Directive).

3.1. Special Areas of Conservation (SACs) and Special Protection Areas (SPAs)

The designation of Special Areas of Conservation (SACs) under the Habitats Directive takes place in three steps. In the initial phase, Member States propose a list of sites that either host certain habitat types or certain endangered species (Article 4(1), Habitats Directive). Habitat types that must be proposed as SACs are listed in Annex I of the Habitats Directive. Annex I specifies a total of about 200 habitat types, including 25 different types of grassland communities, and 51 different forest types. Annex II contains endangered animal and plant species. Sites hosting these species can be proposed by the Member States as well. This Annex contains about 700 species of mammals, reptiles, amphibians, fish, invertebrates, and plants. Birds are not listed here. Several of the habitat types and the species listed in Annex I and II have been marked as priority habitat types or priority species, indicating that they are especially vulnerable or threatened.
In the second phase, i.e. the phase in which we are now,​[11]​ the European Commission decides which of the proposed sites will be declared of Community importance (Article 4(2)) (SCI, Site of Community Importance). The Commission will pay special attention to transboundary sites and to sites hosting priority habitat types or priority species.
Once the Commission has made the selection of SCIs (Article 4(3)), Member States during the final phase are obliged to designate the sites of Community importance as a SAC under national law. The legal regime protecting these sites (i.e. Article 6, see below) comes into force, when the Commission makes the selection of SCIs, so before the actual designation by the Member States as a SAC, but after the submission of the proposals by the Member States.
The Birds Directive has a similar procedure for designating Special Protection Areas (SPAs) for 181 species of bird listed in Annex I of the Birds Directive. However, there is one important difference to the procedure for the designation of SACs under the Habitats Directive. Member States themselves have the obligation to select and designate SPAs without interference from the European Commission. These procedures have already formally been concluded in all Member States. The legal regime protecting SPAs comes into effect immediately after the designation by the Member State.
All of these SPAs and SACs are supposed to form a coherent ecological network throughout Europe called Natura 2000 (Article 3). The main goal of Natura 2000 is to link different areas throughout Europe in order to combat habitat fragmentation, which is regarded as a major cause of the extinction of species (Quammen, 1996).
By April 2003, 3,042 sites had been designated under the Birds Directive, encompassing 235,815 km², while 15,453 sites had been proposed under the Habitats Directive, covering 457,863 km².​[12]​ Compared to their entire national territory, SPAs under the Birds Directive comprise a few per cent in France or Ireland to as much as 22.3 or 24.1% in Denmark and the Netherlands, respectively. SACs under the Habitats Directive cover between 7.4% (France) and 23.8% (Denmark) of the national territory.​[13]​
Once an area has either been designated under the Birds Directive or selected by the European Commission under the Habitats Directive, a strict legal regime applies. Originally, the Birds Directive had its own legal regime for SPAs, laid down in Article 4(4) of the Birds Directive. This was a very strict regime, which was replaced in 1992 by the regime that was adopted for SACs under the Habitats Directive. Since then, Article 6 of the Habitats Directive has applied to all of these areas (including the ones designated under the Birds Directive). Article 6 of the Habitats Directive obliges Member States to:​[14]​

1.	Establish the necessary conservation measures which correspond to the ecological requirements of the habitat types or species listed on the sites (Article 6(1)). Under this provision, competent authorities have to ensure that the owner(s) of a SAC actively manage the site, for instance, by taking such positive action as regulating the ground water level or by applying certain agricultural practices.
2.	Take appropriate steps to avoid the deterioration of natural habitats and the habitats of species, as well as significant disturbance of the species for which the areas have been designated (Article 6(2)). This provision applies to existing activities affecting a SAC, such as agriculture, fisheries, recreation, or military use.
3.	Assess the implications of any plan or project likely to have a significant effect on the site. This provision applies to projects such as the construction of roads or railways, the building of houses or the exploration for fossil fuels. The word ‘likely’ indicates that the precautionary principle has to play a role when determining whether a prior assessment is necessary or not (Backes & Verschuuren, 1998). Although the Habitats Directive does not include rules on the means to carry out the prior assessment, it often takes the form of an environmental impact assessment (European Commission 2000).​[15]​ If it is concluded that there are significant negative effects, according to Article 6(3) of the Directive, the project cannot proceed.

However, Paragraph 4 contains an exemption to this rule. If there are imperative reasons of overriding public interest, including those of a social or economic nature, the project may still go ahead, provided there are no alternative solutions and all compensatory measures are taken to ensure that the overall coherence of the Natura 2000 network is maintained. If priority habitat types or priority species are involved, advice from the European Commission must be requested prior to the decision to go ahead with a project under the terms of Article 6(4).




The second set of rules in both the Birds and Habitats Directive are rules on species protection. All European species of wild birds and the species listed in Annex IV of the Habitats Directive are protected against (Articles 5 and 6 Birds Directive; Article 12(1), and Article 13(1) Habitats Directive):

	all forms of deliberate capture or killing;
	deliberate disturbance, particularly during the period of breeding, rearing, hibernation, and migration;
	deliberate destruction or taking of eggs;
	deterioration or destruction of breeding sites or resting places;
	deliberate picking, collecting, cutting, uprooting, or destruction of plants;
	keeping, transport, sale or exchange, or offering for sale or exchange, specimens of plants taken in the wild and most species of wild birds (including readily recognizable parts or derivates of such birds).

Again, derogation from these provisions can be granted (under Article 16 of the Habitats Directive), provided that:

	there are no satisfactory alternatives; and
	the derogation is not detrimental to the maintenance of the species concerned at a favourable conservation status in their natural range.

Examples of specific reasons for such derogation include: the interest of protecting wild flora and fauna; the prevention of serious damage to, for instance, crops or other types of property; or for imperative reasons of overriding public interest, including those of a social or economic nature. This exemption clause is very similar to the provision of Article 6(4).
Derogation for imperative reasons of overriding public interest of a social or economic nature only applies to species protected under the Habitats Directive, not to birds. The Birds Directive, in Article 9, only allows for derogations on the grounds of the interests of public health and safety, air safety, and to prevent serious damage to crops, livestock, fisheries, etc. Therefore, the Birds Directive, as far as species protection is concerned, is stricter than the Habitats Directive. The more lenient regime, allowing for economic and social considerations to be taken into account, was only adopted for the provisions that apply to area conservation, not for the provisions on species protection.​[17]​




In addition to these rules in the Habitats Directive, the European Commission, in January 2002, published a Proposal for a Directive on Environmental Liability with regard to the Prevention and Remedying of Environmental Damage.​[18]​ According to the proposal, operators of activities causing damage or an imminent threat to biodiversity are obligated to repair such damage or take preventive measures (Article 4 and 5). In case they are unwilling to do so, the competent authorities are required to restore biodiversity, in which case they can recover the costs from the operator who caused the damage or the imminent threat (Article 7). In the proposal, ‘biodiversity’ is defined as the natural habitats or species listed in the Annexes to the Birds and Habitats Directives, and other habitats or species protected under national law (Article 2(1)(2)). The proposal also provides rules for the competent authority to ensure the remedying of environmental damage, such as rules on compensatory restorative action covering interim losses to biodiversity pending total recovery of biodiversity to the ‘baseline condition’ (Annex II). This is the condition of the natural resources and ecosystem services that would have existed had the damage not occurred, estimated on the basis of historical data, reference data, control data, or data on incremental changes (such as the number of dead animals) (Article 2(1)(1)). This proposal offers competent authorities a strong enforcement tool and, therefore, it seems to be an important addition to the rules in the Habitats Directive. This is especially true, since environmental NGOs will be accorded the right to request the competent authority to take action under this Directive (Article 14), and to have decisions, acts, or failures to act, by the competent authority reviewed by national courts (Article 15).

4. SELECTED CASE LAW BY NATIONAL COURTS AND THE ECJ ON THE HABITATS DIRECTIVE

The provisions of the Birds Directive and the Habitats Directive, many of which are vague, have been interpreted in many cases by both the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and by national courts. Generally, the ECJ, later followed by national courts, follows a rather strict interpretation of the provisions of both Directives, aiming for optimal achievement of the objectives of the Directives. In this section, I will give some examples of case law to show the consequences of the Habitats and the Birds Directive.

4.1. Designating Special Areas of Conservation

There is substantial case law on the designation of sites. Although, the wording of the relevant provisions of both Directives appears to imbue Member States with a wide margin of discretion to decide which sites to include in the designation process, the ECJ has severely circumscribed this discretion. The Court has decided that only ornithological​[19]​ or ecological​[20]​ interests may play a role when deciding on the designation of sites. Economic considerations may not be taken into account.
As far as bird areas are concerned, the Court presumes that all the sites listed in the International Bird Association report ‘Important Bird Areas in Europe’ (IBA) must be designated as SPAs under the Birds Directive.​[21]​ A Member State can only overturn this designation when it can establish that such a site is no longer an important bird area. A corresponding rule applies when deciding on the geographic scope of a site. All of an area that is determined to be of ornithological interest has to be designated by the Member State. In 1999, the ECJ held that France failed to fulfill its obligations since it had designated only 2,750 hectares of the Seine estuary, while 21,900 hectares was considered to be of importance for the birds listed in Annex I of the Birds Directive.​[22]​
Many other Member States have been faced with similar judgments, either for designating an insufficient number of SPAs under the Birds Directive,​[23]​ or for failing to propose sufficient SACs under the Habitats Directive.​[24]​ 

4.2. Applying Article 6 on designated sites

Many cases on the legal regime that applies to designated sites (i.e. on Article 6) have been decided by the ECJ and by national courts. These cases can be divided into three groups: cases on the transposition of Article 6 into national legislation regarding nature conservation (4.2.1); cases on specific projects that have an impact on a SAC or SPA (4.2.2); and cases on the question whether Article 6 must be applied to decisions regarding sites that have not been formally designated as a SAC or a SPA, but that qualify as such, i.e. the issue of ‘direct effect’ (cf. section 2, paragraph 3) (4.2.3). The latter seem to be extreme cases, but it is an important category of cases for two reasons. First, many Member States, at least initially, were not very active in designating SPAs under the Birds Directive. If Article 6 has direct effect, the authorities in the Member State are obliged to apply this Article, even to sites that they did not designate. This would be a strong weapon in the hands of NGOs that want to force authorities to comply with EC-legislation. Second, the designation process for SACs under the Habitats Directive still has not been completed. This means that no less than 14,900 sites that have been proposed to the European Commission by the Member States go unprotected until the Commission has selected the SCIs from the proposals (see above, section 3). If Article 6 has a direct effect, proposed sites already may have some legal protection.

4.2.1. Transposition of Article 6 into national legislation
Transposition into national legislation of the requirements of Article 6, was slow: infringement procedures were started against many Member States, some of which are still pending,​[25]​ while others have led to judgments in which the ECJ concluded that the Member State in question did not comply with the duties of Article 6.​[26]​


4.2.2. Applying Article 6 in specific cases
There are cases, when Member States did not apply Article 6, either directly (direct effect, cf. 4.2.3) or through national (implementing) legislation. An interesting judgment of the European Court of Justice demonstrating the consequences of Article 6(2) was a case against France related to the Poitevin Marsh, which was drying up due to drainage and cultivation for agricultural purposes.​[27]​ The case makes clear that existing activities, such as agriculture, must be regulated when a site has been designated as a SPA or when a site should have been designated as such. This is true even when these activities take place outside the boundaries of the SPA.
Designating an area as a SAC or SPA, therefore, can have many consequences for existing activities in that area. In a Dutch case, involving a local zoning plan for the island of Texel, a national court decided that the plan was invalid because attention had not been paid to the consequences of military activities taking place on a part of the island.​[28]​ The plan itself did not alter these activities, which had been conducted for decades. However, since this area was on the Important Bird Area list, the court ruled that the area should have been designated as a SPA, and therefore found that the Habitats Directive had direct effect. The Court subsequently tested the zoning plan against Article 6(2) and concluded that it was not clear whether the military activities would result in deterioration of the site or disturb the species for which the area should have been designated. The Court held that competent authorities should have assessed this before adopting the plan. Note that this Court inadvertently tested against Article 6(2); the Court should have tested against Article 4(4) of the Birds Directive as a consequence of the Basses Corbières case, discussed below (section 4.2.3).
A case recently decided by the European Court focuses on potential deterioration of a SPA in Ireland as a consequence of overgrazing. This area has been designated as a SPA for the Red Grouse (Lagopus lagopus), but it has also been proposed as a SAC. According to the Court, Ireland failed to fulfill the duties arising from Article 6(2) for this area.​[29]​ The Court makes it clear that adopting plans to limit the density of grazing on heath land and bog is insufficient to protect the Red Grouse. Rather, Ireland is required to actually limit present agricultural activities within the SPA as a whole. This can be achieved, for instance, by limiting the intensity of sheep rearing (‘destocking’). Article 6(2) thus restricts all present activities that deteriorate the area.
As far as the provisions for decisions on plans or projects are concerned, i.e. Article 6(3) and 6(4), there is a large body of case law, mainly by national courts. Cases before the European Court of Justice can be expected in the near future as well, since the European Commission recently initiated several infringement procedures on projects in which Article 6(3) and 6(4) may not have been properly applied.​[30]​ The cases that came before national courts once again demonstrate that the provisions of Article 6(3) and 6(4) must be taken very seriously. In the Netherlands, an Administrative Court annulled a permit for the exploration of mineral gas in a wetland designated as a SPA under the Birds Directive, because there had not been a proper assessment of the consequences of the drilling for the area as a whole and for the birds for which this area had been designated as a SPA.​[31]​
In another Dutch case, the judges showed little regard for a government decision to allow the construction of a transboundary business park on the Dutch/German border in one of the last habitats of the common hamster.​[32]​ Although this decision was made on the basis of Article 16 of the Habitats Directive (i.e. species protection, see section 4.3, infra), it is an interesting case to be discussed here as well, since, as mentioned above, the exemption clause from Article 16 is very similar to that of Article 6(4). According to the court, no serious study had been made into possible alternative projects that would achieve the objective of job creation without damaging habitat. Also, the court held that the government had not sufficiently demonstrated that the unemployment rate for the region was so high that an overriding public interest justified the threats to the habitat.
A case before the German Federal Administrative Court also demonstrates that the goal of the project determines the alternatives that must be explored and what kind of information must be gathered in order to pass the test of Article 6(4).​[33]​ Regional authorities had drawn up a plan to re-route a motorway from the city of Hildesheim to a new route outside the city. However, this new route would pass through a SAC under the Habitats Directive containing a priority habitat (xeric sand calcareous grasslands). To justify this new route, the regional authorities claimed that the new road was necessary to protect human health. Many casualties on the existing road were attributed to its path through a densely populated area. The Federal Administrative Court found that if this was the reason to derogate from Article 6(3), two things should have been made very clear in the plan to re-route the road. First, the authorities should have shown that it is impossible to make the existing road safer, for instance, by practical measures such as road junctions, or by adjusting the speed limit for particular sections of the road. Secondly, the authorities should have presented evidence that the new road would lead to fewer casualties.
Examples of projects that were approved under the guidelines of Article 6(3) and 6(4) exist as well. In 1995, the European Commission had to give its advice on a project, because priority habitat types were affected. Although such an advice differs from a Court decision, because the Commission, obviously, is not an impartial judge, the Commission’s advice does shed some light on the meaning of Article 6 in specific cases. The European Commission adopted two opinions in which the Commission approved two sections of a planned motorway in Germany, causing adverse effects on natural sites in two river valleys in the northern part of eastern Germany. Both valleys had been designated as SPA under the Birds Directive, as well as SAC under the Habitats Directive (the latter because priority habitats had been present in the area, i.e. fenland, bog land, and residual alluvial forests). The Commission answered four questions as the basis of its decision as follows (Nollkaemper, 1997):​[34]​

1. 	Are imperative reasons of overriding public interests involved? 
The answer is yes: The socio-economic need to develop this area in the former East Germany is such an imperative reason of overriding public interest.
2. 	Will the project actually achieve economic and social benefits? 
Although the economic analysis contained some margin of uncertainty, the Commission accepted the decision by the German Parliament that this actually would be the case.
3. 	Are there alternative ways to achieve the economic and social benefits? 
This is the core element of the Commission’s opinion. The Commission agreed with the German government that there were no alternative possibilities to develop this area. The road had to cross the river somewhere. However, the Commission did force the German government to adopt an alternative route that was less harmful than the original plan, and to adopt mitigating measures, such as noise barriers and measures to retain oil run-offs.
4. 	Do compensatory measures maintain the overall coherence of the Natura 2000 network?

Unfortunately, the Commission did not examine this test in great detail. The Commission simply agreed with the proposed compensatory measures, although there was no certainty that these measures would actually enable the ecosystem to function in the lost areas as it would have without the advancement of the socio-economic measures. In its manual (European Commission, 2000), published a few years later, the Commission took a much tougher stand. The manual states, among other things, that:

	the result of compensatory measures must be operational at the time when the damage occurs on the site of concern;
	the compensatory measures should address in comparable proportions the habitats and species negatively affected; and
	the compensatory measures should provide functions comparable to those that had justified the selection criteria of the original site.


4.2.3. Does Article 6 take direct effect before areas are selected?
Since it is not entirely up to Member States alone to designate areas under the Habitats Directive, some argue that it is not possible to directly apply Article 6 before the Commission has selected the areas that are of community importance (Jans, 2000b). Some national courts also take this position,​[35]​ but most courts now think that Article 6 does have direct effect. This, for instance, is the case in the United Kingdom (UK),​[36]​ in Germany,​[37]​ and in the Netherlands.​[38]​




Since the Birds Directive came into effect in 1981, the European Court of Justice has rendered many judgments on species protection.​[42]​ Many more cases can be expected, given the number of infringement procedures that the European Commission is currently preparing.​[43]​ Most of these cases concern either national hunting regulations or trade in birds. The European Court of Justice developed a rather strict approach toward national hunting regulations. As mentioned above, Article 7 of the Birds Directive provides that Member States may allow hunting of certain species of birds, but not during the breeding season. Hunting on migratory species is not allowed during the return to their rearing grounds. The Court has ruled that national hunting regulations must take into account prolonged dependence of the fledglings on the parents, and early migration.​[44]​ In setting hunting dates, Member States have to produce scientific evidence that such dates do not impede the complete protection of the species in question. Furthermore, Member States are only allowed to designate staggered closing dates for hunting, varying according to species, if they take into account the risk of confusion. Dates for species displaying similarities should be fixed in such a way as to ensure complete protection for species.​[45]​ Following these ECJ judgments, national courts have declared many national decisions invalid. For instance, in 1999, the French Council of State held that the provisions introduced into the Rural Act in 1998, making it possible to set dates for early opening of waterfowl hunting, ‘are almost all incompatible with the objectives of species preservation found in Article 7(4)’ of the Birds Directive.​[46]​ In 2000, new hunting legislation has been introduced in France to bring the legislation into conformity with the Birds Directive.​[47]​
The strict approach of the European Court of Justice on species protection can also be seen in the recent Red Grouse case mentioned above.​[48]​ In this case the Court states that even in case the Red Grouse’s habitat had not been designated as a special protection area, Article 3 of the Birds Directive still requires Member States to take the requisite measures to preserve, maintain or re-establish a sufficient diversity and area of habitat for all the species of birds covered by the Directive. These obligations exist before any reduction is observed in the number of birds or any risk of a protected species becoming extinct has materialised. Since it is clear to the Court, from a report prepared in 1993 by the Irish Wildbird Conservancy, a non-governmental organisation dedicated to the protection of birds in Ireland, that the Red Grouse is one of the country's 12 most endangered breeding birds, and that its numbers had diminished by more than 50% over the last 20 years, the Court had no trouble in finding that Ireland had not succeeded in observing its obligations under the Birds Directive because it had not controlled the overgrazing.
Another example of the strict approach by the Court is a case on the derogation clause of Article 9 of the Birds Directive (cf. section 3.2). The European Commission brought Italy before the Court, because of six complaints concerning the Birds Directive. Complaints included the alleged use of automatic weapons for hunting and the capture and sale of various species of migratory birds. Although Member States usually are thought to have discretion as to how provisions of Directives are to be implemented (see above, section 2), here the Court was less lenient. Before addressing the six complaints against Italy, the Court in general terms overturned a more lenient interpretation and held that the essential elements of Article 9 have to be transposed completely, clearly, and unequivocally into national rules. The Court stated: ‘(...) a faithful transposition becomes particularly important in a case such as this in which the management of the common heritage is entrusted to the Member States in their respective territories’.​[49]​
Further, in the Van der Feesten case, the Court determined that all of the provisions of the Birds Directive apply to all birds that reside naturally within the territory of all of the EU Member States, as well as accidental migrants. The Court also stated that subspecies of birds that occur naturally outside the EU are also considered within the scope of the Directive, if the species to which they belong, including other subspecies of that species, occur naturally in the wild within the European territory.​[50]​ The latter are included to ensure that there will be no uncertainty as to which particular subspecies must be protected: all subspecies must be protected.
An interesting example of the application of this judgment in national law is a recent criminal case before the Dutch Supreme Court.​[51]​ An individual, who had imported 60,000 specimens of a Chinese subspecies of the Eurasian tree sparrow into the Netherlands and had offered them for sale there, was prosecuted by the Public Prosecutions Department. The High Court originally had acquitted him, because the birds had been legally caught in China and the subspecies (Passer montanus saturatus) did not occur in any of the EU Member States, and therefore did not fall within the scope of the Birds Directive. However, the Supreme Court reversed this decision, referring to the Van der Feesten judgment of the European Court of Justice. It held that since the species Passer montanus occurs in the territory of EU Member States, importing and selling the Chinese subspecies Passer montanus saturatus is prohibited by Article 6 of the Birds Directive as well.
So far, most of the case law on species protection under the Habitats Directive has been developed at the national level. The ECJ only very recently rendered its first decision on Article 12 of the Habitats Directive in a case on the protection of sea turtles in Greece.​[52]​ The Court found that Greece had failed to fulfill its obligations under Article 12 of the Directive to take the requisite measures to establish and implement an effective system of protection for the sea turtle (Caretta caretta) during its breeding period and to prevent activities that would degrade or destroy its breeding sites. According to the Court, the Greek authorities had not done enough to stop the use of mopeds on a beach the turtles used for breeding, and to prevent the presence of small boats near the breeding beaches. The Court emphasized that promulgation of rules and regulations by Greece was not enough: Greece had to ascertain that the turtles were not disturbed during the laying period, the incubation period, the hatching of the eggs, as well as during the baby turtles’ migration to the sea. Now and in the future, according to the Court, Greece has to make sure that there are no sources of danger to the life and physical well being of the turtles.
National cases clearly show the importance of Article 12 and the derogation clauses of Article 16 for biodiversity conservation. A good example is the Dutch case, briefly mentioned above, in the section on SACs (section 4.2.3). This case concerned plans to construct a transboundary business park on the German/Dutch border near the cities of Heerlen and Aachen to combat regional unemployment in the area. However, the site hosts one of the last populations of the common hamster (Cricetus cricetus) in the Netherlands and in western Europe. This species is listed in Annex IV of the Habitats Directive, and therefore falls under the protection of Article 12. In a series of judgments, the highest Dutch administrative court found that the competent authorities in the Netherlands had not rightfully applied the derogation clauses​[53]​ because they had failed to demonstrate that:
	there were no satisfactory alternatives. The authorities had only assessed other possible locations for the business park. They should have also considered options for upgrading existing business parks or the possibility of creating jobs in other sectors, such as education or health care;
	the derogation was not detrimental to the maintenance of the populations of the species at a favourable conservation status in their natural range. The authorities did not show that populations dynamics data indicated the species would maintain itself on a long-term basis as a viable component of its natural habitat if the business park was constructed, nor that the natural range of the species would not be reduced as a consequence of the decision to construct the business park;
	the derogation was necessary for an imperative reason of overriding public interest. According to the Court, combating regional unemployment can be an imperative reason of overriding public interest. However, in this case, the Court found that the authorities had used outdated unemployment figures, and, therefore, had not established that the construction of the business park was an imperative reason of overriding public interest.

Other national courts throughout Europe reached similar important decisions for landscape diversity conservation on the basis of the Habitats Directive. For instance, the UK High Court decided that governmental decisions on activities outside the territorial waters also have to be tested against Article 12. The Habitats Directive includes protection of a certain species of reef-forming coral (Lophelia pertusa) and cetaceans. Therefore, the decision to grant licenses for oil and gas exploration in the North Atlantic in a 200 nautical mile zone, well outside the 12-mile territorial waters limit, has to be subject to the Habitats Directive in order to be able to establish a system of strict protection.​[54]​

5. THE FILSALB AREA 

Many of the grasslands of the Swabian Alb mountain range (State of Baden-Württemberg, South Germany) qualify as a semi-natural habitat type of European Community interest, whose conservation requires the designation of special areas of conservation. In the Filsalb area, grassland habitat types listed in Annex I to the Habitats Directive include: Juniperus communis formations on heaths or calcareous grasslands; rupicolous calcareous or basophilic grasslands; semi-natural dry grasslands and scrubland facies on calcareous substrates; hydrophilous tall herb fringe communities of plains and of the montane to alpine levels, and lowland hay meadows. Other Annex I habitat types such as the medio-European calcareous scree of hill and montane levels, petrifying springs with tufa formation, calcareous rocky slopes with chasmophytic vegetation, caves, Asperulo-Fagetum beech forests, medio-European limestone beech forests, and oak-hornbeam forests also are encountered in the proposed SAC 'Oberes Filstal' (1,294 ha), as well as some Annex II species, such as the Spanish Flag butterfly (Callimorpha quadripunctaria) and the Alpine Long-horned beetle (Rosalia alpina). Both are priority species. Because most of the habitat types mentioned above are priority habitat types, the Baden-Württemberg State Government has included parts of the upper Fils Valley in the list of proposed SACs submitted to the European Commission. Should the Commission adopt the 'Oberes Filstal' as a site of Community interest, then this will have the consequences dealt with above.
First of all, the German authorities will have to establish the necessary conservation measures which correspond to the ecological requirements of the habitat types concerned. This means that the authorities have to ensure that landowners actively manage the site according to a plan in which the necessary conservation policy for the area has been laid down.
Secondly, the authorities have to take appropriate steps to avoid the deterioration of natural and semi-natural habitats. For the grassland ecosystems maintenance of use, corresponding to traditional patterns, is a key condition for the preservation of site qualities. Other existing activities that could affect the SAC, such as hunting, fisheries and recreation, are not prohibited, but should be conducted in such a manner that no deterioration takes place. Usually, existing activities that have taken place over a long period in the area can be continued, since in spite of, or even more importantly, due to these activities the area qualifies as a SAC. This shows that these activities do not cause deterioration. However, should the activities intensify, for instance because of an enormous increase in the number of tourists, then the authorities will have to find a way to limit these activities in order to reach the overall goal of the Habitats Directive: no deterioration.
Future EU agricultural policy holds a key for the successful management of the area. Grazing with sheep has shaped plant communities in many of the most precious grasslands of the Swabian Alb (Mattern, 1985). Grazing regimes can be maintained only if a sufficient income for shepherds can be generated from this activity. Generation of an appropriate income from comparatively small-scale enterprises depends on efficient regional marketing and the provision of funds to compensate for the use of grassland that is low in terms of productivity (see Haber & Fehrenbach, this volume). Shepherds have plenty of options to graze more productive grasslands in the area.
The existing hydrophilous tall herb fringe communities (Annex II habitat type) in the proposed SAC 'Oberes Filstal' allow for a particularly interesting side aspect. In the 'Oberes Filstal' existing habitats of this type are dominated by Filipendula ulmaria and Lythrum salicaria. Both are common and rather robust species of plants favoured by abandonment of marginal lands and subsequent succession. In spite of these meadows classifying as SACs in the present state, species diversity and significance for conservation can be significantly increased in these humid meadows by mowing and subsequent removal of the cut. Mowing resets succession and allows for more plant and associated animal species to move in. For the very stable hydrophilous tall herb community dominated by F. ulmaria mowing will not change the outcome of succession, because nutrient depletion is irrelevant based on the fact that atmospheric nutrient deposition in central Europe is generally high. That is, succession would naturally regenerate the current state if mowing were again abandoned. 
Does the Habitats Directive in this rather particular case impede management that optimises for nature conservation purposes? According to Article 6(1) of the Habitats Directive, the necessary conservation measures corresponding to the ecological requirements of the habitat types or species listed on the sites have to be established. However, in some cases, the various habitat types and species present in the area may necessitate conflicting conservation measures. The Directive does not give any clue on how to solve this problem. It seems necessary that the competent authorities, together with the landowners and other interested parties, such as local or regional NGOs, work out a conservation plan, in which the various conservation measures are reconciled.
This problem of conflicting conservation purposes seems especially relevant on sites that host semi-natural (cultural) landscapes. Conserving a cultural landscape always implies the existence of human activities. Conservation is inseparable from appropriate land use (see Küster, this volume). The main objective of all parties involved is to find the proper use in order to maintain the relevant habitat type.
The third, and final, consequence of the designation of the area under the Habitats Directive is the duty to assess the implications of any plan or project likely to have a significant effect on the site. Decisions to allow the construction of traffic infrastructure, a new hotel, or the operation of an installation for the intensive rearing of cattle can only be taken after the consequences of these activities on the SAC have been assessed. With such an assessment, the authorities will have to ascertain that the project will not adversely affect the integrity of the site concerned. In case this cannot be ascertained, the authorities have to prohibit the project, unless there are imperative reasons of overriding public interest at stake. The simple economic interest of one company is not sufficient: the project has to be beneficial to the social or economic interest of the region as a whole. Other conditions are: there are no alternative solutions for the problem concerned, and all compensatory measures are taken to ensure that the overall coherence of the Natura 2000 network is maintained. Since priority habitat types and priority species are involved, advice from the European Commission must be requested prior to the decision to go ahead with a project.




6. THE MAIN ELEMENTS 
OF THE U.S. ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 

Although the Endangered Species Act (ESA) is the main legal instrument in US nature conservation policy, it must be stressed that there are other strong legal instruments to protect landscape diversity.​[55]​ Most importantly, the United States federal government owns large portions of land that have been set aside for nature conservation. For example, an area as large as the entire state of California has been set aside as wildlife reserve (36,000 km2), with an additional 30,000 km2 designated as national parks and another 80,000 km2 as national forests (Sax, 1993). Still, the 1973 Endangered Species Act is the main instrument in US nature conservation policy that is binding for both private citizens and government organisations. The ESA replaced two Acts from the 1960's that had some flaws, such as the fact that they did not contain any substantive provisions affecting land use and taking, and the fact that none of their provisions regulated government activities (Darin, 2000).
The ESA is an extensive Act that not only deals with species and habitat protection within the US, but also regulates trade of endangered species pursuant to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES). In this paper, I will deal only with provisions that are similar to the provisions of the EC Habitats Directive, i.e. provisions on the designation of habitats and on species protection. I will also not deal with state legislation. Most states have legislation on endangered species in addition to the federal ESA.

6.1. Designation of ‘critical habitat’

As far as the protection of habitat is concerned, Section 4(b)(2) provides for the designation of ‘critical habitat’. This is habitat for species that have been listed as endangered under the ESA; therefore, habitat conservation in the US is always aimed at the conservation of a certain species, while in the EU, habitat conservation can be aimed at a certain type of habitat as well. The latter approach seems to be more function oriented and, thus, more precautionary, because it aims at protecting habitat, regardless of whether a certain species on that site is endangered. Critical habitat includes (Sec. 3(5)(A)):

(i) the specific areas within the geographical area occupied by the species, at the time it is listed in accordance with the provisions of section 4 of this Act, on which are found those physical or biological features (I) essential to the conservation of the species and (II) which may require special management considerations or protection; and
(ii) specific areas outside the geographical area occupied by the species at the time it is listed in accordance with the provisions of section 4 of this Act, upon a determination by the Secretary that such areas are essential for the conservation of the species.
The Secretary of the Interior​[56]​ has the power to designate critical habitat after taking into consideration the economic impact, and any other relevant impact. The Secretary may exclude any area from the critical habitat, if he determines that the benefits of such exclusion outweigh the benefits of specifying such area as part of the critical habitat, unless he determines, based on the best scientific and commercial data available, that the failure to designate such area as critical habitat will result in the extinction of the species concerned (Sec. 4(b)(2)).
The obligation to take economic impacts into account was a result of the 1978 amendments to the 1973 Act. These amendments were deemed necessary after the famous Snail Darter case. Only five months after the US Supreme Court ordered the construction of the Tellico Dam on the Little Tennessee River to be halted, because it would destroy the Snail Darter’s critical habitat,​[57]​ Congress amended the ESA, in a way similar to the introduction of less strict rules in the Habitats Directive after the Leybucht case in Europe in 1992 (see section 3.1). The amendments also introduced the provision that federal agencies could apply to the newly formed Endangered Species Committee for an exemption from some of the requirements of the Act. This Committee is appointed by the President of the US at cabinet level, and is often called the “God Squad”, since it has the power to exempt from the prohibition for any federal agency to authorize, fund, or carry out any action that would result in the destruction or adverse modification of critical habitat (Sec. 7(a)(2)) (Darin, 2000). Exemption can be granted after (Sec. 7(g)(3)) (Grosse, 1997):

	the Secretary of the Interior has been consulted;
	a reasonable and responsible effort has been made to develop and fairly consider modifications or reasonable and prudent alternatives to the proposed agency action;
	a biological assessment of the consequences of the proposed action has been conducted.

It is clear that these provisions are similar to Article 6 sections 3 and 4 of the Habitats Directive, except for the obligation to compensate for any loss of habitat by restoring the original ecological functions. This obligation is not present in the ESA.

6.2. Prohibition of ‘takings’

Species that are threatened or endangered​[58]​ can be listed as such by the Secretary of the Interior, following an extensive procedure (Sec. 4) (Grosse, 1997). In 1978 the obligation to take economic considerations into account was introduced as well, but unlike the designation of critical habitat, 1982 amendments reversed this. Since 1982, only biological factors may be used to determine whether to list a species as threatened or endangered. Economic impacts cannot be considered in listing decisions on species (unlike decisions on designating critical habitat, where - as stated above - economic considerations do play a role).
Once listed, federal agencies have to ensure that any action authorised, funded, or carried out by the agency is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of endangered or threatened species (Sec. 7). Again, exemption can be granted under the same conditions as mentioned above for critical habitat. In addition, it is not allowed, for any person, including private persons, to ‘take’ individual specimens of the species listed. The term ‘take’ has been defined as: ‘to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct’ (Sec. 3(18)).
Here as well, exceptions apply to the prohibition to take endangered or threatened species. Most importantly, the Secretary may permit the taking of endangered species, if such taking is incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity. Economic activities like agriculture or industry, or infrastructure projects clearly are such activities. However, a permit for such activities can only be granted if (Sec. 10):

	the applicant submits a conservation plan, specifying the (1) impact which will likely result from such taking, (2) what steps the applicant will take to minimise and mitigate such impacts, and the funding that will be available to implement such steps, (3) what alternative actions to such taking the applicant considered and the reasons why such alternatives are not being utilised, and (4) such other measures that the Secretary may require as being necessary or appropriate for purposes of the plan;
	the taking will be incidental;
	the applicant will, to the maximum extent practicable, minimise and mitigate the impacts of such taking (this can be ensured by including terms and conditions in the permit);
	the applicant will ensure that adequate funding for the plan will be provided;
	the taking will not appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival and recovery of the species in the wild; and
	the recovery plan will be met and the Secretary has received such other assurances as he may require that the plan will be implemented.  


7. SOME OF THE RESULTS AFTER 30 YEARS OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT

Case law on the Endangered Species Act is numerous. Many of these cases, such as the Snail Darter case mentioned above, received much public and media attention. The power of animals – animals that most people never even heard of, such as the Snail Darter, the Cui-ui fish and the Northern Spotted Owl – to stop large projects like the construction of dams, or even threaten to bring the economic development of an entire region to a halt, was ridiculed by many. It is not possible to give an overview of all of the case law here (see Grosse, 1997). Rather, I will just provide a few examples to illustrate the impact of the ESA.
A little known case (at least in Europe) deals with the already mentioned Cui-ui fish (Chasmites cujus) and the Cutthroat trout (Oncorhynchus clarkii). Both species are listed as endangered and threatened. A power company and a water conservancy district wanted to sell water from the Stampee Dam and the Little Truckee River for use in two cities in Nevada. The Secretary did not consent to this activity, because under the ESA priority has to be given to the conservation of both endangered species. In 1984, the Court upheld this decision.​[59]​ The obligations under the ESA require the Secretary not only to conserve protected species, but also to promote the species to a point where it no longer is endangered or threatened. Taking water from the fish habitat is not in line with these obligations (Grosse, 1997).
Much more complicated is the case of the Mission Blue Butterfly (Icaricia icarioides missionensis) in the San Bruno Mountain near San Francisco. Private companies purchased virtually all the undeveloped land on the mountain. In 1975, the companies planned to construct houses and office buildings, but they also gave part of the area to the county in order to establish a park. Shortly after completion of the land purchase, the Fish and Wildlife Service discovered that the Mission Blue Butterfly, which was listed on the Endangered Species List, occurred on the mountain. A committee of all the relevant stakeholders then agreed upon a plan to develop the area and preserve the butterfly habitat at the same time. In the revised project, only 14% of the habitat would have been disturbed. In 1983, the Fish and Wildlife Service granted a permit for the incidental taking of the Mission Blue Butterfly on the mountain. Unfortunately for the stakeholders involved, several other plaintiffs still filed a court action. However, the court ruled that the Fish and Wildlife Service had provided sufficient information on the population and the expected survival of the species in the San Bruno mountain area. The court therefore upheld the permit (Grosse, 1997).​[60]​ In other cases, too, courts stressed the obligations of the competent authorities under the ESA to conduct scientific assessments in order to generate the best available data on the status of certain species and the possible consequences for the species in question as a result of the planned activities.​[61]​
Finally, the famous case of the Northern Spotted Owl (Strix occidentalis caurina). In this case, the Secretary of the Interior had issued a regulation, according to which significant habitat modification or degradation that actually kills or injures wildlife was considered to be an illegal ‘taking’ under the ESA. In 1991, a group of landowners, logging companies and families dependent on the forest products industry brought legal action against the Secretary, because the regulation implied that they were no longer able to log in forests inhabited by the Northern Spotted Owl. Originally, the Court of Appeals decided that the ESA only applies to the direct use of force against the animal taken, but the Supreme Court reversed this decision.​[62]​ According to the Supreme Court, the ESA also applies to injury or death of a protected species due to habitat modification, even if this happens indirectly (Grosse, 1997).
A long and painful struggle to reconcile the parties followed the ruling of the Supreme Court. Finally, even the President of the United States got involved and organized a meeting to reconcile the parties. Sax shows that in the public debate the ‘issue was seen as simply protecting a particular species, rather than getting a regional economy onto track where it could function over the long term in harmony with contemporary environmental values’ (Sax, 2001). He also states that:
One of the most important lessons taken from the spotted owl debacle was that the Endangered Species Act offered a structural model, habitat-based planning, that was designed both to protect the species in their habitat, and to allow economic activity to continue by lifting rigorous prohibitions so long as species viability was protected, adverse impacts were mitigated and minimized, and opportunities were presented to move towards long-term recovery.
After 30 years of the ESA, two main positions emerge, when searching the literature for a general evaluation of the results. Some think the ESA still has many shortcomings, either because of legal issues (such as the ‘undermining’ legislative actions by Congress) or because of the low political and financial priority for the implementation of the Act (causing a low percentage of critical habitat designation since 1978) (Darin, 2000). Critics simply point at some figures (Harte, 2001):
Of the approximately 1000 species that have been listed during the history of the Act, about 1% have gone extinct, 1/3 are declining, 1/3 are stable, 1/10 are improving or are recovered, and for ¼ information is lacking.
A second group of academics is more positive about the results of the ESA. Joseph Sax, in a series of articles, points at several advantages of the Act, but also admits that the importance of the ESA has only begun to be felt and acknowledged in the last half-dozen years or so (Sax, 2001a):

	attention now focuses on habitat protection, indeed protection of the larger land and water environments upon which endangered species depend;
	it has now been acknowledged that biodiversity must be protected on private land as well, introducing new and innovative ways to accommodate the need to use private land for agriculture, mining, forestry, urban growth, while at the same time maintaining and restoring ecological services (note that European nature conservation relating to cultural landscapes has always been forced to accommodate private interests; contrary to the US, in Europe the public sector never owned large portions of land that have been set aside for nature conservation purposes)
	the Endangered Species Act offers a system within which it is possible to reconcile economic activities and biodiversity conservation by developing long-term plans with all stakeholders involved (see extensively Sax, 2000);
	the Act has both broad and deep public support;
	it is difficult to fashion a different sort of biodiversity protection law with as much “teeth” as the present Act. There is fear that changing the Act will ultimately weaken rather than strengthen it (Sax, 2001b).

Sax evens predicts that biodiversity policy, which in the US is equal to applying the ESA, will be the centrepiece of environmental law in the coming decades (Sax, 2000).

8. CONCLUSION: COMPARING THE HABITATS DIRECTIVE AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 

Although there are many differences between the European and the US legal systems in general, and between European and US biodiversity and landscape protection laws in particular, it is evident that both the Habitats Directive and the ESA have been constructed on the same foundations. As it relates to the ESA and the Birds and Habitats Directive, both in the US and in Europe, we see a stringent application of the regulatory provisions concerning species and habitat protection. At the same time, neither the ESA, nor the Birds or Habitats Directive necessarily halt economic development. These legal provisions do, however, bring an end to rash decision-making in favour of activities or projects that may harm biodiversity or landscape diversity. Only after thorough assessment, as to the effects of activities or projects on habitats, and of the economic benefits of these activities, can decision-making proceed. If there are alternative solutions that do not harm biodiversity, or do so but to a lesser extent, these solutions must be chosen. However, both in Europe and the US, it is possible for a project to proceed if there is no reasonable alternative. In this case, there has to be clear evidence that the project is necessary for imperative reasons of overriding public interest. Such conditions are difficult to demonstrate under the strict guidelines within the Directives. In order for the condition of overriding public interest to be met, the project has to go beyond the simple economic interests of one or two business corporations. Instead, it should benefit an entire region. Even if reasons of overriding public interest can be shown, all biodiversity loss must be compensated in order to safeguard existing populations of endangered species and the European network structure of special areas of conservation. This explicit legal duty to take compensatory measures has been laid down in the Habitats Directive, but not in the ESA.
Another difference is the scope of both sets of rules. For landscape diversity conservation, the EC Habitats Directive, from the outset, seems to have been better suited than the ESA, because it is not solely aimed at critical habitat for certain endangered or threatened species, but also at certain natural or semi-natural (i.e. cultural landscapes with characteristic low-intensity use features) habitat types per se. Such a precautionary approach is necessary for a long term protection of the species: a species would probably not have become endangered, if focus had been on protecting and restoring appropriate habitat functions in the first place. In the US, it is now generally acknowledged, too, that habitat-based planning is the main tool to protect species under the ESA. 
A striking similarity between the history of the Birds Directive and the Habitats Directive in Europe, and the ESA in the US, is the fact that both regulatory systems saw a slow start. Both sets of rules even were relaxed to better accommodate economic interests. In the US, the ESA now has much public support and actually allows interested stakeholders to look for possibilities to reconcile economic and biodiversity and landscape diversity interests. In Europe, the first signs of a similar development are visible right now. Large projects are negotiated by all parties involved, looking into landscape diversity and biodiversity protection for an entire region in an integrated fashion, and drawing up ‘compensation plans’ to restore lost habitats. This development is based on the fact that courts in the last two to three years began to test projects against the provisions of the Habitats Directive. As in the US, it took a while for all actors involved to realize that the Habitats Directive is not only an important instrument to direct means for the conservation of biodiversity, but also to provide constraints (of varying degrees) on decision-making for projects that may harm biodiversity. Because of the persistence of the European Commission, which continues to institute infringement procedures against EU Member States for failure to fulfill obligations under the Birds and Habitats Directives, national authorities as well as national courts have come to realize the impact of these Directives. Both the Habitats Directive and the ESA establish a line in the sand. This line initially may generate conflict, but in order to resolve such conflict, it also fosters cooperation and innovation (Snape et. al., 2001). 
Indeed, non-governmental organizations have successfully seized the new opportunities offered by the ESA and the European Directives to protest and combat the loss of biodiversity and landscape diversity. In Europe, the proposal for a Directive on Environmental Liability seems to further improve their position. The reason for the initial success of NGOs is simple: administrations were not accustomed to providing the amount of data, and legal arguments, that are now needed before a project that harms biodiversity can be approved. Courts tend to find administrative decisions inadequate, when the authorities are not able to present sufficient data. However, authorities, as well as developers now recognize that they need to develop their plans so as not to deteriorate protected areas or harm populations of endangered species. Their efforts must be applauded. The benefits to wildlife and their habitat from this new precautionary approach will be far-reaching.
However, much more needs to be done. For Europe, the main challenge is to develop a coherent system of special protected areas throughout the continent. So far, many of the SPAs and SACs are small islands in areas dominated by large-scale economic activities. These islands wait to be connected by contiguous ecological corridors in order to effectively combat habitat fragmentation. Over the past ten years, the collective legal bases of the Birds Directive and Habitats Directive have served as a foundation for such a system. We will have to wait and see, whether the next ten years are as successful as the past decade. 
Management issues concerning sites that have been designated under the Birds Directive or the Habitats Directive must be solved as well. The example of the Filsalb area shows that, especially in semi-natural or cultural landscapes, there probably will be a constant conflict between (proper) land use and conservation. It is essential that for each site protected under either Directive the proper land use is established. The authorities, landowners, as well as NGOs, will have to work together to determine ‘proper use’ (for semi-natural or cultural landscapes) or the necessary conservation measures (for natural landscapes) corresponding to the ecological requirements of the habitat types or species listed on the site. The situation is even more difficult, if the various habitat types and species listed at a specific site need different, and maybe even conflicting, conservation measures that optimise the ecological conditions.
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